"A Better Space Mission Systems threat assessment by leveraging the National Cyber Range"

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Abstract

Aerospace cyber SME's successfully led efforts to bring the first major comprehensive cyber assessment of the Space Mission Architecture into the National Cyber Range.

The National Cyber Range (NCR) is a DoD owned national asset with the aim of providing realistic cyber simulation, assessment and modeling.

Efforts will help advance cyber research, optimize defensive cyber operations and enhance space mission resilience.

SSDP




Briefing Outline

- The National Cyber Range
- The Space Virtual mission Environment
- Cyber exploits
- Vulnerability mitigations
- Summary / conclusions



It's a race to find the space cyber vulnerabilities before the bad guys do

NCR Layout



Our approach: We brought our unique equipment, NCR provides the Infrastructure and Cyber Adversaries....Fights on!

- SSDP Provided the Front End Processors and objectives
- NCR provided the:

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- Cyber Security Exploit Team (CSET) to assess the Front End Processors
- Network shown in the Tested Environment




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Source: http://www.acq.osd.mil/dtetrmc/docs/20150224_NCR%20Overview_DistA.pdf

NCR Server Room



Purpose built computers that manage a communication to and from a computer system

Cyber Threat Vectors employed:

- Reconnaissance: Network scans
- Surveillance: Network Presence
- Access, lateral movement and actual exploits:
 - 1. Out-of-Band Management network attack
 - 2. Man in the Middle
 - 3. Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Flood
 - 4. Denial of Service (massive Logs)
 - 5. Physical access (Insider Threat)





CYBER SPACE



Bottom line: using real cyber exploits on real Space components

Surveillance: Network scans

Note: iptables enabled which is the "Shields Up configuration"

- Scanning the network to find potential open ports with iptables enabled and a restricted IP address
- Red FEP Scan results:

root@RTkali:14:45> nmap -e eth1 -s5 -T5 -n -Pn 10.50.2.10 -oX /root/scans/shieldsup-scan.xml -p-Starting Nmap 7.40 (https://nmap.org) at 2017-05-25 14:45 EDT
 Nmap scan report for 10.50.2.10
 Host is up (0.00024s latency).
 All 65535 scanned ports on 10.50.2.10 are filtered
 MAC Address: 34:17:EB:EB:A3:43 (Dell)
 Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 658.46 seconds
 Black FEP IP restricted scan results:
 root@RTkali:14:45> nmap -e eth1 -s5 -T5 -n -Pn 192.168.2.10 -oX /root/scans/shieldsup-scan.xml -p-Starting Nmap 7.40 (https://nmap.org) at 2017-05-25 14:45 EDT
 Nmap scan report for 192.168.2.10
 Host is up (0.00024s latency).
 All 65535 scanned ports on 192.168.2.10 are filtered
 Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 658.46 seconds

Use lptables to restrict the number of ports exposed to the bare minimum. With a non restricted IP scans only showed SSH (port 22) and NTP (port 123)

Scans did not turn up any information in the hardened "Shields Up" state, however system used two ports (i.e. SSH and Timing)

Network Presence

Out of Band Management

- Out-of-Band Management (OOB) widely used for remote access into networks
- Out-of-Band Management could be vulnerable if not configured properly



Man in the Middle

ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) spoofing

- Use ARP spoofing to create disruptions
- However, use of properly configured SSH will protect integrity and confidentiality

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Network Mitigations

- Mitigating Man in the Middle (ARP spoof)
- SSH Authentication flood Mitigation
 - Separate the remote login from the local login account
- Denial of Service Log Mitigation
 - Prevent /var/log and /var/log/audit locations filling up by overwriting older log files
 - Creating a warning when log locations are filled to a set level



Conclusion / Summary of leveraging the NCR

National Cyber Range FEP Threat/Cyber Assessment

NCR	Key Highlights
Innovation	 Serves as pathfinder for future cyber / threat assessments
	 First major Space Mission architecture leveraging the NCR
Velocity	 Compresses normal assessment times from 9 months to 3 months
Flexibility	 Able to quickly create multiple assessments at different classification environments
	 Immersive, dynamic, operational cyber environment
Cost savings	 SSDP saved \$500K in cost avoidance by using the NCR vice creating an internal test development network
Better results	Capability to identify & isolate vulnerabilities but also demonstrate efficacy of fix actions

For more information

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Questions?



