

Streamlining Security Testing and Security Risk Management as part of a Secure System Engineering Framework at ESA

Marcus Wallum

Ground System Architectures Workshop 2019 26/02/2019

© 2019 by the European Space Agency Published by The Aerospace Corporation with permission

ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use

A recap..



• Back in 2017..




- Cyber security emerging as a strategic objective for ESA
- Proposed a Framework for Secure Software and Systems Engineering for the Ground Segment
- What were we talking about?
 Where are we now?

ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use

Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 2

A recap...SSE Standard: What are the key processes? Cesa



process

- Risk Assessment
- Requirements Engineering
- Design and implementation
- Verification and validation
- Operations, maintenance, disposal
- Authorisation (including accreditation & certification processes)

A recap.. What are the key support tools?

 Supporting methodologies and tools, aimed at streamlining implementation:


-> Security requirements engineering (GASF) Status: Mature, Operational in ESA

 Security Verification and Validation -Automated penetration testing (PenBox)
 Status: Under Development

Security Risk Management (SEST)
 Status: Mature, Operational



Generic Application Security Framework



ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use

Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 4

· = ■ ▶ = = + ■ + ■ = ≝ = ■ ■ ■ = = = = ■ ■ ■ ■ = = = ■ ■

A recap.. What are the key support tools? (2)

 Supporting methodologies and tools, aimed at streamlining implementation:

-> Security requirements engineering (GASF) Status: Mature, Operational in ESA

-> Security Verification and Validation -Automated penetration testing (PenBox) Status: **Under Development**

Security Risk Management (SEST)
 Status: Mature, Operational

Penetration Testing & Security Awareness Management in a Box



ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use

Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 5



A recap.. What are the key support tools? (3)

- Supporting methodologies and tools, aimed at streamlining implementation:
 - -> Security requirements engineering (GASF) Status: Mature, Operational in ESA
 - -> Security Verification and Validation -Automated penetration testing (PenBox) Status: Under Development

-> Security Risk Management (SEST) Status: Mature, Operational

Security Engineering Support Tool



ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use

Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 6



A recap.. What are the key support tools? (4)

esa

 Supporting methodologies and tools, aimed at streamlining implementation:

-> Security requirements engineering (GASF) Status: Mature, Operational in ESA

-> Security Verification and Varidation -Automated penetration testin (PenBox) Status: Under Developmen

-> Security Risk Management (**CEST**) Status: **Mature, Operational**

ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use

Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 7

PenBox: Why automate?


- Comprehensive security testing of software and systems is complex and expensive
- Penetration testing in particular is high-cost and effort-intensive - not scalable
- Dedicated **experts** and specialised tools
- Broad attack surface at multiple layers, however actions are repeatable (cf. IKC)
- Results not easily interpretable for non-experts
- Need to remain aware of limitations











Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 8

= II 🛌 ## ## #I 💻 🔚 == II II = == ## 🛶 🙆 II == ## ## #



1. Define Macro Threat Scenarios and Attack trees

Generic phases and "hack asset" attack tree applicable for majority of ground systems Start -Start from localhost context (e.g. internet) Contact phase Attack from context Context exploration Attack phase Target new context Use exploited shell ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use

Generic tree refined for specific scenarios e.g. Send malicious command:

- Hack asset
- Fingerprint asset (MCS)
- Verify commanding capability

Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 9

2. Define security **requirements profile** for ground systems Assign as security **controls with traceability to attack nodes**

 Image: second second

Example attack node:

Gain access to application: Brute force

Requirement:

attempts

The system shall detect

and lock-out repeated

unsuccessful authentication

Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 10


ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use







3. Define automation architecture for **chaining penetration testing tools** with modes, configuration, execution and logic to the second




- Tools require valid inputs for valid runs – parameter types and execution modes
- Valid runs execute and results are extracted to a results tree
- Pilot.py process computes valid runs for execution from results tree (chaining)

Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 11

= II 🕨 ## ## II **=** 🔚 = II II = = ## 🛶 🚺 II = ## ##



3. Define automation architecture for **chaining penetration testing tools** with modes, configuration, execution and logic $\textcircled{}_{\bigotimes}$



- Tools will not run unless there are new results (no repetition)
- Tools may be "on-demand" or "continuous"
- Tool input handlers:
- Shell (most common)
- GUI (Xvfb, PyAutoGUI)
- Docker (rare)

Z II ≥ II = + II = ⊆ Z II II Z Z H = 0 II Z II Z H + II = 1


Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 12



3. Define automation architecture for **chaining penetration testing tools** with modes, configuration, execution and logic $\textcircled{\begin{subarray}{c}}{\hline \begin{subarray}{c}{c}{\hline \begin{subarray}{c}{c$

Arpspoof	JohnTheRipper	RIPE	
Bluto	LocalSubnetsDetector	SimplyEmail	
Burpsuite	metagoofil	slowhttptest	
<u>censys.io</u> Crackmapexec	Metasploit	smbclient	
CTFR	Mimikatz	Sqlmap	
dnsenum	Net group	SSH-audit	
dnsmap	Net user	SSHScan	
dnsrecon	nikto	sslscan	
dnssearch enum4linux	nmap	sslyze	
Fierce	nslookup	subfinder	
getprivs	ODIN	sublist3r	
getsystem	OpenVAS	theharvester	
gobuster	Patator	tshark	
Hot Potato	Pwned	unix_privesc_checker	
HPING3 Hydra	raven wafw00f		
InSpy Responder		waldo	
		whois	

 Over 50 open source penetration testing tools benchmarked and integrated!



Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 13

ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use

4. Allocate tools to attack nodes to **execute** a Scenario's attack tree on a System Under Test

Tools

Network discoverv Port/Service discovery Break authentication Gain access to network

Attack tree

ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use

Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 14




<u>SUT</u>

Results tree




4. Allocate tools to attack nodes to **execute** a Scenario's attack tree on a System Under Test






4. Allocate tools to attack nodes to **execute** a Scenario's attack tree on a System Under Test






4. Allocate tools to attack nodes to **execute** a Scenario's attack tree on a System Under Test







5. Implement logic from results to prove scenario success and test
and verify security requirements
Trigger/success




nodes defined per requirement Executes requirement assessment logic

 Assessment result pushed to result tree


Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 18





6. Display results and generate reports

6. Display results and generate reports



All log data is recorded


- Full traceability: scenario-attack node-toolresult-SUT-requirement
- Enables detailed report generation

ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use



PenBox: Proof of Concept successful!





· = ⅠⅠ ▶ \$\$ ■ + ⅠⅠ ■ ≝ = ⅠⅠ ⅠⅠ = = # ▲ ◙ ⅠⅠ = \$\$ ₩ ₩

SEST: Brief Overview

- Security Risk assessment: Another typically complex and cumbersome process
- SEST Tool (web-based) enables a guided and semi-automated implementation of a risk assessment methodology (MEHARI)
- For use at earliest phase of the system engineering lifecycle






ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use

· = ■ ► = = + ■ + ■ = ≝ = ■ ■ ■ = = = ■ ■ ■ ■ = = = ■ ■

Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 22

SEST: Brief Overview – Data Model



- Multiple Projects and associated profiles for re-use
- Risk Assessment procedure uses various data models:
- Asset model
- Threat model
- Vulnerability model
 - Safeguard model (Requirements)
- Computed risk scenario, residual risk and risk treatment models


Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 23



SEST: Brief Overview - conclusions




- Guided methodology and easy UI
- **Increased efficiency** (with limitations)
- Automatic computations (malfunctions<->business processes, seriousness<->risk scenarios, etc.) for faster iterations
- Exportable results and project templates for re-use. Support to Audits
- Asset model candidate for future MBSE link
- Import/mapping of requirements (GASF)



ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use

Secure Systems Engineering for Space: Future

 Follow-up activity "SSE4Space": consolidate and integrate to form a streamlined framework for secure systems development



- Integration with **MBSE** framework •
- Space Data Link Security
- Space Segment Security

ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use

• Assurance: Integrated

Certification concept

• Additional testing tools

Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 25





Thankyou for your attention!

Questions?

ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use

Secure Systems and Software Engineering

 ESOC has lead a gap analysis and subsequent definition of an ESA-internal Secure Software Engineering (SSE) standard (released 2016).

-> Panel and WG composed of representatives from all programmes and directorates

- ESSB-ST-E-008: Secure Software Engineering Standard (normative)
 ->Standardizing secure SW engineering processes identified by the gap analysis
- ESSB-ST-E-007: Secure Software Engineering Handbook (non-normative)
 -> Complementing the standard: guidelines and recommendations
- ESSB-HB-E-009: **Glossary** of Secure Software Engineering Terms
- Applicable standard for the ESOC ISMS and all in-house SW developments
- Full adoption at ECSS level is planned

E	esa
---	-----



	esa	
EA (MOLESTED - For Official Use	Cesa	
EA INCLEDTED - for Oficial Use	eesa	1
DOCUMENT		
Glossary of Secure Softwa	are Engineering Terms	
Prepared by B55C WG on Secure Software Reference E535-57C-0-09 Internet 2535-57C-0-09 Data of faces 4 Data of faces 4 Data of faces 4 Data of faces 5 Data of	e Tagineering	
Document Type Standard Distribution ESA	Durspean Speer Agen Agenes spatiale surspeen	CY be

Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 27

ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use

· _ II 🕨 :: 🖛 + II 💻 들 💶 II II = _ _ H 🖬 🛶 🔯 II 💶 :: II 💥 🛀

GASF: General Application Security Framework

- Security requirements specification and management is a complex subject
- The General Application Security Framework tool (GASF) is an **easy-to-use** tool:
- Simplifies the application of a complex subject matter for non-experts whilst not diminishing the suitability and effectiveness of security controls
- Permits the efficient definition of security requirements for a mission, system or software development
- Supports approval workflows and informed decision making
- Supports document generation (SRS)
- The framework consists of 3 pillars:
 - 1. Security requirement catalogues
 - 2. Context-specific profiles which specify needs
 - 3. Requirements engineering tool




ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use

Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 28

GASF: Security Requirement Catalogues





ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use

Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 29

GASF: Tool



- Web Application
- Requirements can be **amended** or **commented**
- Projects can be compared
- Ad-hoc discussions and comments support **collaboration**
- Search engine
- Capture of **details and history** (versioning, ID, verification method etc)
- Generation of **reports** (PSO can review deltas verses profile recommendations) and **SRS**

GASE Tool: GASE Evolution					
er Project Item Export Need View demo_user (Technical Office					
: 8	Read Compare Link Discussion Default				
Security Requirements	Ensure privacy and protection of personally identifiable information - GASF-E_0005				
GASF-E Requirement catalogue	Requirement Verification Related items Discussion ⁶ Need Details History				
Contractual Requirements	: Title	: Human ID			
Regulations	Ensure privacy and protection of personally identifiable information	GASF-E_0005			
✓	: Text				
Privacy and protection of personally identifiable information should be ensured as required in the applicable legislation and regulation.					
\heartsuit \bigtriangledown Use software in accordance with contracts agr.					
Stablish cryptographic controls in compliance .					
Comply and protect Intellectual Property Rights	5				
Ensure privacy and protection of personally id	: Comment				
Protect records	In particular, in order to comply with legislation on protection of personal data and privacy	the following shall be applied:			
Supplier relationships	Search	- [
Documentation Requirements	Search	Q :			
Management Requirements	: Search: "Access control" Items: 68	Wed 25-07-2018 11:12:26 +			
Functional Requirements		: Item sets			
	Image: Second state Image: Second state	"Access control"			
	Image: Constraint of the security protection				
	PGSSRS-R640				
	□ ♥ PGSSRS-R500				
	□ ♥ Q □ ♥ PGSSRS-R690				


ESA UNCLASSIFIED - For Official Use

Marcus Wallum | 26/02/2019 | Slide 30

•

GASF: Workflow





· Experns interactive incomes poetheouse detoataideue tifnate selection to apply

- PSO or audit report
- Prostiletie (nsugref oer d) 00 (01 (RS nits panet)) adSpteditto Requirements Specification
- Declare already implemented controls
- Require controls to be implemented

