



Extended Validation and Verification for Situation-Aware Middleware Architectures

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Today's Agenda


Situation-Aware Middleware Architecture: Introduction

- Scenario
- Research Issues
- Project Goal and Overview
- EVS: A Solution Approach

🕹 Summary







Research Issues

We have to provide timely and transparent support in middleware

- for application adaptations that are triggered by different situations?
- for situation-aware, open-standard communication
- ✤ How to generate an open middleware framework
 - for generating new and/or reusing 3rd party components?
 - for multiple QoS management mechanism that is tied with various situations of a given mission?
- How to provide efficient, secure services to application developers
 - especially in an multicast and wireless environment in a manner that is survivable and efficient





Project Goals

Adaptive, Situation-Aware Middleware (SAM) Architectures


- As the next generation of distributed real-time and embedded (DRE) middleware
- Adaptable, Secure, Reliable architectures

(Collaboration with Dr. Stephen Yau, Arizona State University)



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Overview of Situation-Aware Middleware Architecture

Innovation of SAM

- Situation-awareness.
- Separation of aspects components and middleware core components.
- Automated component integration for combining crosscutting aspects.
- Weta-programmable dynamic instrumentation.
- Trade-off analysis for application and target middleware model optimization.
- >> Validation and Verification Framework.
- Security and survivability mechanisms utilizing software agents.





V&V: Focus of This Talk

Difficult to apply traditional V&V technique to situationawareness applications

- State explosion problem (huge number of state space)
- Redundant, unnecessary constraints related to dynamic changing of situations
- Lack of scalability
 - BDD (Binary Decision Diagram)/OBDD (Ordered BDD)
 - Common data types
 - enumerations, integer, real types





Today's Agenda

Situation-Aware Middleware Architecture: Introduction

- EVS: A Solution Approach
 - Overview
 - Examples
- 🕹 Summary







EVS: A Solution Approach

- EVS (Extended Validation & Verification System)
 - Combination of model checking and theorem proving (salsa)
 - Automatic property-driven abstraction method
 - SS (Situation Specification)
 - AM (Abstraction Mechanism)
 - QoSmon (QoS monitor)
 - TEVS (Translator for EVS)
 - EVS (Extended Validation and Verification System)
 - RG (Report Generator)









Predator: An Example

Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE)



is to take

Predator's mission is to take reconnaissance pictures and send back the pictures to the carrier.



Predator command and control in the carrier.





Step 1. Situation Specification

Mission 1: Destroy an enemy target.

Resources:

missile, radar, fuel, etc.

Actions: launch missile(), guide missile()

QoS:

1) The missile should be launched within **n** seconds after the command is received from the carrier.

Situations:

Situation 2: If it receives a "destroy" command, the drone should launch missile.

Situation 3: After the missile is launched and before it hits the target, the radar system should guide the missile.

Mission 2: <u>Reconnaissance</u>

Resources:

radar, communication system, fuel, etc.

Actions: scan(), send-information()

QoS:

- 1) Each scan action has to be completed by **m** seconds.
- 2) The information sent back to the carrier should not be tampered.

Situations:

- Situation 1: If the drone is in enemy territory, then every \mathbf{k} seconds (k>m), the radar should perform a scan action
 - and a send-information action.

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AMI

AMn

TEVS

EVS eSPIN.eSMV....) QoSmo

Situation Specification (Continued)

QoS-Security {

Entity goal; Action in; Action out; Mechanism m1; out.input=m1(in.result); } Sec1; QoS-RealTime { Int Duration: Int Importance; } RTC1; RTScan = new RTC1 (m, 0); RTLaunchMissile = new RTC1 (n, 1); RTGuideMissile = new RTC1 (null, 1); SecureSendInfo = new Sec1 (Carrier, scan, sendInfo, PublicEncryption); Resource { Int Missile; Int Communication; Int Radar; Int[] getResourceAvailable(); } DroneResource; ResrScan = new DroneResource (0, 0, 1); ResrSendInfo = new DroneResource (0, 1, 0); ResrLaunchMissile = new DroneResource (1, 0, 0); ResrGuideMissile = new DroneResource (1, 0, 1);

Situation-aware-object {

Situation1: Location is in enemy territory, every k seconds Situation1 is true; Situation2: Drone receives "destroy" command, and missile has not been launched yet; Situation3: Missile has been launched and it has not hit the target yet. [local] [Activate at Situation1] scan () RequireResources ResrScan withQoSConstraint RTScan: [outgoing] [Activate at Situation1] sendInfo () RequireResources ResrSendInfo; withQoSConstraint SecureSendInfo; [local] [Activate at Situation 2] launchMissile () RequireResources ResrlaunchMissile WithQoSConstraint RTSLaunchMissile: [outgoing] [Activate at Situation3] guideMissile () RequireResources ResrGuideMissile WithQoSConstraint1 RTGuideMissile; WithQoSConstraint2 another securityQoS } DroneControl; QoSExceptionHandler { fail RTScan do action1: fail SecureSendInfo do action2:

}DroneExceptionHandler;








WAM1: Remove irrelevant information

- Based on analysis of relationship between variables







Abstract Mechanism (Continued)

AM2: Spatial Information Reduction

Based on spatial analysis
 based on spatial
 relationships


$$L_{BattleField} = \{zone1, zone2, zone3\};$$

$$L_{Enemy} = \{zone1, zone2\};$$

$$Loc = \{L_{Enemy}, L_{BattleField}\};$$

$$L_1 Loc; L_2 Loc;$$

scan (
$$L_1 == L_{Enemy}$$
 AND $L_2 == L_{BattleField}$);
 \rightarrow scan ($L_1 == L_{Enemy}$);




Abstract Mechanism (Continued)

AM3: Temporal Information Reduction

 Based on temporal analysis based on temporal relationship scan(); AFTER launchMissile(); launchMissile(); AFTER guideMissile();


```
→ scan(); AFTER guideMissile()
```











Salsa: Specification

module TSCE_drone

type definitions OnOff : {On, Off};

monitored variables Missile, Radar, Control_System : OnOff;

controlled variables TSCE_drone : OnOff;

internal variables

launchMissile, guideMissile, scan, sendInfo : bool; Situation1, Situation2, Situation3 : bool; Mission1, Mission2 : bool;

guarantees

/* true properties */ Property1 = @T(Radar = On) when (Situation1) => scan'; Property2 = (Missile = On and Radar = On) => guideMissile; /* false properties */ Property3 = (Missile = On and launchMissile) => not scan;

Property4 = (Radar = On and guideMissile) => Missile = Off;

definitions

var launchMissile initially false :=

ev [] @F(scan) -> false [] @T(scan) when (Missile = On) -> true [] @T(guideMissile) when (not scan) -> false ve

var guideMissile initially false :=

ev

[] @F(scan) -> false

- [] @T(scan) when (Missile = Off or Radar = Off) -> false
- [] @T(scan) when (Missile = On and Radar = On and launchMissile) > true

ve

var scan initially false :=

ev

[] @T(Radar = On) when (Situation1) -> true [] @T(Radar = On) when (not Situation1) -> false

ve

end module





Salsa: The Result

Analyzing SAL specification in file: tcse.sal. Checking disjointness of all modules. Checking module TSCE_drone Number of Nontrivial Atoms: 0 Checking launchMissile ... disjoint. Checking guideMissile ... disjoint. Checking scan ... disjoint. All checks passed. Number of failed/passed verification conditions: 0/7 Time (total) : 0.226 : 0.078 Rewriting Partitioning : 0.000 Integer solving : 0.000 Bdd ops(total,gc) : 0.058, 0.000

BDD statistics. Number of variables : 25 Number of nodes User : 96 Total : 467 Table size : 65536 Checking coverage of all modules. Checking module TSCE_drone Number of Nontrivial Atoms: 0 All checks passed. Number of failed/passed verification conditions: 0/0 Time (total) : 0.076 Rewriting : 0.013 Partitioning : 0.000 Integer solving : 0.000 Bdd ops(total,gc) : 0.000, 0.000

BDD statistics. Number of variables : 25 Number of nodes User : 1 Total : 2 Table size : 65536 Checking guarantees in all modules. Checking module TSCE_drone Number of Nontrivial Atoms: 0 Checking Property1 ... pass Checking Property2 ... fail Checking Property3 ... fail Checking Property4 ... fail

Checks failed for: Property4, Property3, Property2 Number of failed/passed verification conditions: 3/1 Time (total) : 0.315 Rewriting : 0.131 Partitioning : 0.000 Integer solving : 0.000 Bdd ops(total,gc) : 0.072, 0.000

BDD statistics. Number of variables : 25 Number of nodes User : 119 Total : 528 Table size : 65536



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Salsa: Extension to Situation-Aware

Extension for Spatial Relationship

```
Extension for Temporal Relationship
```

```
definitions
```

```
.....
```

```
var TSCE_drone=
    case Mission1
    [] @T(launchMissile) CROSSING @T(enemy_area) ->
        if []true -> true []false -> false fi
        esac
        case Mission2
        [] @T(scan) -> if []true -> true []false -> false fi
        esac
```

definitions

.

```
var TSCE_drone=
case Mission1
[] @T(launchMissile) BEFORE @T(guideMissile) ->
if []true -> true []false -> false fi
esac
case Mission2
[] @T(scan) -> if []true -> true []false -> false fi
esac
```






EVS: Extension to OBDD

BDD(Binary Decision Diagram) and OBDD(Ordered BDD) for property1


– (Radar = On AND Situation1) => scan;







EVS: CTL Capability



```
S(~EF(scan ^ EG ~guideMissile)) = Ø
```





Summary

Extended V&V for Situation-Aware Middleware Architectures

- Redundant, unnecessary constraints related to dynamic changing of situations
 - Represent by Situation Specification
 - Reduce by Situation-aware Abstract Mechanisms (Spatial and Temporal).
- Reduce the number of state space for V&V
 - By salsa (combining model checking and theorem proving)





Contact Points

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